| The Braddock Expedition also called Braddock's Campaign was a failed British attempt to capture the French Fort Duquesne in the summer of 1755 during the French and Indian War. The expedition takes its name from General
Edward Braddock, who led the British forces and died in the effort.
Braddock's defeat at the Battle of the Monongahela was a major setback for the British in the early stages of the war with
France.
Braddock's Road
Braddock's Expedition was just one part of a massive British offensive against the French in North America that summer. As
commander-in-chief of the British Army in America, General Braddock led the main thrust, commanding two regiments (about 1,350 men) and about 500 regular soldiers and militiamen from several British American
colonies. With these men Braddock expected to seize Fort Duquesne easily, and then push on to capture a series of French
forts, eventually reaching Fort Niagara. Twenty-three year-old George Washington, who knew the territory, served as a volunteer
aide-de-camp to General Braddock.1
Braddock's attempt to recruit Native American allies from those
tribes not yet allied with the French proved mostly unsuccessful; he had but eight Mingo
Indians with him, serving as scouts. A number of Indians in the area, notably Delaware
leader Shingas, remained neutral. Caught between two powerful European empires at
war, local Indians could not afford to be on the side of the loser. Braddock's success or failure would influence their
decisions.
Setting out from Fort Cumberland in Maryland on May 29, 1755, the expedition faced an enormous logistical
challenge: moving a large body of men with equipment, provisions, and (most importantly for the task ahead) heavy canon, across
the densely wooded Allegheny Mountains and into western
Pennsylvania, a journey of about 110 miles. Braddock had received important
assistance from Benjamin Franklin, who helped procure wagons and
supplies for the expedition. Among the wagoners, incidentally, were two young men who would later become legends of American
history: Daniel Boone and Daniel Morgan.
The expedition progressed slowly, in some cases moving as few as two miles a day, creating Braddock's Road—an
important vestige of the march—as they went. To speed up movement, Braddock split his men into a "flying column" of about
1,500 men (commanded by him), and a supply column with most of the baggage, which lagged far behind. They passed the ruins of
Fort Necessity along the way, where the French had defeated Washington
the previous summer. Small French and Indian war bands harried Braddock's men during the march, but these were minor
skirmishes.
Meanwhile, at Fort Duquesne, the French garrison consisted of only about 250 regulars and Canadian militia, with about 640
Indian allies camped outside the fort. The Indians were from a variety of tribes long associated with the French, including
Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis. The French commander, realizing that his fort could not withstand
Braddock's canon, decided to launch a preemptive strike: an ambush of Braddock's army as he crossed the Monongahela River.
Battle of the Monongahela
On July 9, 1755, Braddock's men crossed the
Monongahela without opposition, about nine miles south of Fort Duquesne. The advance unit under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage began to move ahead, and unexpectedly came upon the French and Indians,
who were hurrying to the river, behind schedule and too late to set an ambush. The battle, which came to be known as the
Battle of the Monongahela (or the Battle of the Wilderness, or just Braddock's Defeat), was joined.
Braddock's impressive column of almost 1,500 men faced less than 900 French and Indians.2
After an initial defense, Gage's advance group fell back. In the narrow confines of the road, they collided with the main body
of Braddock's force, which had advanced rapidly when the shots were heard. The entire column dissolved in disorder as the French
and Indians enveloped them and continued to fire from the woods and ravines. Following Braddock's example, the officers kept
trying to reform units into regular order within the confines of the road, mostly in vain. The colonial militia either fled or
took cover and returned fire. In the confusion, some of the militiamen who had taken to the woods were mistaken for the enemy and
fired upon by British regulars.
Finally, after three hours of intense battle, Braddock went down, and resistance collapsed. By sunset, the surviving British
and American forces were fleeing back down the road they had built. Braddock died of his wounds during the long retreat, on
July 13.
Of the approximately 1,460 men Braddock had led into battle, 456 were killed and 421 wounded. (The officers were prime targets
and suffered greatly: out of 86 officers, 63 were killed or wounded.) The roughly 250 French and Canadians had 28 killed and
about the same number wounded; their 637 Indian allies lost but 11 killed and 29 wounded.
Colonel Dunbar, with the rear supply unit, took command when the survivors reached his position. He ordered the destruction of
supplies and cannon before withdrawing, burning about 150 wagons on the spot. Ironically, at this point the demoralized and
disorganized British forces still outnumbered their opponents, who were not even in pursuit.
Aftermath
Braddock's defeat at the Battle of the Monongahela was a momentous event for the people of the region. The French and their
Indian allies found themselves unexpectedly with the upper hand in the struggle for control of the Ohio Country, and a ferocious frontier war quickly escalated. Indians in the area who had been inclined
to remain neutral now found it nearly impossible to do so. And the colonists of "backcountry" Pennsylvania and Virginia found
themselves without professional military protection, scrambling to organize a defense. This brutal frontier war would continue
until Fort Duquesne was finally abandoned by the French as a result of the successful approach of the Forbes Expedition in 1758.
Another notable outcome of Braddock's defeat was the effect it had on the reputation of George Washington. Washington, despite
being in poor health before the battle, distinguished himself as being calm and courageous under fire. He emerged from the
disaster as Virginia's military hero.
Debate
The debate on how Braddock—with professional soldiers, superior numbers, and bigger guns—could fail so miserably
began soon after the battle, and continues to this day. Some blamed Braddock, some blamed his officers, some blamed the British
regulars or the colonial militia. George Washington, for his part, supported Braddock and found fault with the British
regulars.
Braddock's tactics are still debated. One school of thought holds that Braddock's reliance on time-honored European methods,
where men stand shoulder-to-shoulder in the open and fire mass volleys in unison, was not appropriate for frontier fighting, and
cost Braddock the battle. Skirmish tactics that American colonials had learned from frontier fighting, where men take cover and
fire individually ("Indian style"), was the superior method, or so the argument goes.3
A less popular interpretation, though perhaps the one favored by military historians, counters that the European use of
concentrated firepower was unmatched when properly executed, and that the superiority of frontier tactics is an American myth.
Braddock's failure, according to proponents of this theory, was not that he did not use frontier tactics; he failed because he
did not adequately apply traditional military doctrine.4
Footnotes
1. Some accounts state that Washington commanded the Virginia militia on the Braddock Expedition, but this is incorrect.
(Though it is true that Washington commanded Virginia militia before and after the expedition.) As a volunteer aide-de-camp,
Washington essentially served as an unpaid and unranked gentleman consultant, with little real authority, but much inside
access.
2. The Battle of the Monongahela has often been mistakenly described as an ambush.
The encounter was actually a meeting engagement, where two forces clash at an unexpected time and place. The quick and
effective response of the French and Indians led many of Braddock's men to believe they had been ambushed; French documents
reveal that the French and Indian force was too late to prepare an ambush, and had been as surprised as the British.
3. See, for example, Armstrong Starkey's European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815 (University of Oklahoma Press,
1998).
4. This argument is most recently presented in Guy Chet's Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European
Warfare in the Colonial Northwest (University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).
References
- Jennings, Francis. Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America. Norton,
1988.
- Kopperman, Paul E. Braddock at the Monongahela. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973.
- O'Meara, Walter. Guns at the Forks. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965.
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