| The minimum wage is the minimum rate a worker can legally be paid (usually
per hour) as opposed to wages that are determined by the forces of supply and demand in a free market. Each country sets its own minimum wage laws and regulations, and many countries have no minimum
wage.
History
The first moves to legislate wages did not set minimum wages, rather the laws created arbitration boards and councils to
resolve labour conflicts before the recourse to strikes.
- In 1894, New Zealand established such arbitration boards with the Industrial
Conciliation and Arbitration Act
- In 1896, the state of Victoria, Australia established similar boards
- In 1909, the Trade Boards Act was enacted in the United Kingdom, establishing four such
boards
- In 1912, the state of Massachusetts, United States, set minimum wages for women and
children
In the United States and other countries, minimum wage laws were a
common demand of labor unions.
Consequences of minimum wage laws
If the law is successfully enforced, and if they are high enough in real terms (or relative to the average wage), minimum wage laws are alleged to have various
benefits and costs.
Hypothetical costs and benefits
Minimum wages may have the effect of:
- Reducing low-paid work, which may be unfair and exploitative.
- Reducing the dependency of the low-paid on welfare-state benefits, which may in
turn reduce taxes or allow increases of other government outlays.
- Stimulating economic growth by discouraging labor-intensive industries, thereby
encouraging more investment in capital and training.
- Encouraging many of those who would normally take low-wage jobs to stay in (or return to) school and thus to accumulate
human capital.
On the other hand, minimum wages may have the effect of:
- Limiting employment of low-wage earners, and generally increasing unemployment.
- Raising employment barriers for people with little or no work experience or formal education: if a worker's labor is not
worth the minimum, he may not find employment at all.
- Curbing economic growth by increasing the cost of labor.
- Curbing economic growth by lowering the supply of labor.
- Increasing the price of goods and services, since employers pass on employment costs in the form of higher prices. (Opponents
of minimum wage often see a negative income tax, e.g., as a
way to support the lower-waged jobs, with the money coming from those who pay taxes, not those who pay for the products including
the unemployed)
- Decreasing incentive for some low-skilled workers to gain skills.
- Where implemented locally, making labor more expensive than in other areas, which may discourage inward investment and encourage local businesses to relocate their
operations elsewhere.
The effects of minimum wage laws, both positive and negative, may be increased by 'knock-on effects', with increased wages for
workers already earning above the minimum wage. For example, some labor union
contracts are based on a fixed percentage or dollar amount above the minimum wage. Certain public grants or taxes are based on a
multiple of the minimum wage. (For example, a worker may have an exemption if his earnings are below 2.5 minimum wages.)
Debate
The costs and benefits arising from minimum wages are subject to considerable disagreement among economists, though the consensus among economics textbooks is that minimum wage laws should be avoided
whenever possible as the costs exceed the benefits. Indeed, a survey in the Winter 2005 issue of the Journal of Economic
Perspectives reports that exactly two-thirds of academic economists at top universities agree with the statement, "a minimum wage
increases unemployment among young and unskilled."
This unified view was challenged by empirical research done by David Card and Alan Krueger. In their 1997 book Myth and
Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage (ISBN 0-691-04823-1), they argued the negative employment effects of minimum-wage laws to be minimal if not
non-existent (at least for the United States). For example, they look at the 1992 increase in New Jersey's minimum wage, the 1988
rise in California's minimum wage, and the 1990-91 increases in the federal minimum wage. In each case, Card and Kreuger present
evidence ostensibly showing that increases in the minimum wage led to increases in pay, but no loss in jobs. That is, it appears
that the demand for low-wage workers is inelastic. Also, these authors
reexamine the existing literature on the minimum wage and argue that it, too, lacks support for the claim that a higher minimum
wage cuts the availability of jobs.
Critics of this research, however, argue that their research was flawed.[1] (http://www.fee.org/vnews.php?nid=3896),[2] (http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj15n1-8.html) For example, Card and Krueger gathered their
data by telephoning employers in California and New Jersey, asking them whether they intended to increase, decrease, or or
make no change in their employment. Subsequent attempts to verify the claims requested payroll cards from employers to
verify employment, and ostensibly found that the minimum wage increases were followed by decreases in employment. On the
other hand, data analysis by David Neumark and William Wascher, economists who are usually critical of minimum-wage increases,
supported the Card/Krueger results.[3] (http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/minimumw_bp_1996.pdf)
Some idea of the empirical problems of this debate can be seen by looking at recent trends in the United States. The minimum
wage fell about 29% in real terms between
1979 and 2003. Yet real wages have risen in the free market anyway, with real hourly earnings up by 7 percent since 1997 (the
last time the minimum wage was increased). Some argue that a declining minimum wage might reduce youth unemployment (since these
workers are likely to have fewer skills than older workers). In fact, unemployment rates for 16-19 year Americans is relatively
stable (SOURCE Bureau of Labor Statistics: 16 percent in 1979, and 16 percent today). Similarly, poverty rates in the United
States ended their long-term decline almost simultaneously when the "War on Poverty" began in the mid 1960s (The poverty rate was
12.8 percent in 1968 and is 12.5 percent today).
Theoretical arguments
As is usual in serious social science, any empirical conclusion is subject to doubt and is simply the basis for further
questions and research. One key question is the possible theoretical explanation of the different results.
The traditional view that minimum wages have significant negative effects on employment typically assumes that labor markets
for low-skill workers can be characterized as fitting the model of a perfectly competitive market, where the only role of wages is as a cost. On the other hand, if Card and
Krueger's empirical research is valid, it may be explained by the efficiency wage hypothesis which states that higher wages may "pay for themselves" by increasing
worker efficiency (i.e., labor productivity). Higher wages encourage a higher willingness of low-skill workers to stay with their
current employers and to gain experience and skill, while the employers are more willing to train them. Alternatively, if
monopsony exists, then an increase in the minimum wage can raise employment. Alan
Manning's 2003 book, Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets (ISBN 0691113122) suggests that this kind of
market is common if not ubiquitous in labor markets.
Even if Card and Krueger's results are accurate, there may be a "tipping
point" above which their conclusions do not apply and the standard economic consensus does apply. The possible validity of
their research may be the result of political forces: in the United States, business political pressure on legislatures and
Congress may have kept the minimum wage so low that it has little negative employment effect. Further, the Federal minimum wage
has moved away from the presumed tipping point, becoming less relevant. It has fallen from about 50 percent of the average hourly
wage in manufacturing during the late 1960s to less than 40 percent.
Some argue that minimum wage laws "lock-out" the poorest individuals from obtaining employment by legally forbidding them to
compete for jobs by offering to work for lower wages. This argument of course does not apply to the black economy. The idea that a lack of a minimum wage naturally directs employment opportunities to the
most needy is viewed by some as a moral justification for the elimination of minimum wage laws. On the other hand, the fact that
the working poor often struggle to support themselves without government support (eg food stamps) is a moral argument in favour
of a minimum wage, especially given empirical evidence that at a low level it primarily prevents bad employers from competing at
the expense of their workforce.
Some say that if developing countries had minimum wages, or minimum wages commensurate of those of developed countries, that
jobs would not be exported to these poor individuals and their opportunity for economic advancement would be impeded. Other say
that this overlooks the fact that movement of jobs applies above all to industries which require large quantities of unskilled or
low-skilled labour, and that relative prices for such labour are very different. Some say that even with no minimum wage law,
unskilled jobs paying a mere a few cents per hour as is common in many developing countries is not sustainable as these employees
will die.
Wage subsidies
If they exist, it is clear that some of the adverse effects can only occur when minimum wages are implemented and successfully
enforced by government fiat: either these effects are a consequence of the costs of regulation (the consensus) or they do not
exist (Card, Krueger, and others). If, however, a floor on wages is implemented indirectly by providing wage subsidies,
there would not be decreased employment. However, since this program is not a "free lunch", some other economic damage may be
created instead, as with an externality. On the other hand, it is possible
that there are already externalities contributing to unemployment, and that subsidies at the right level would merely be Pigovian solutions to these and would not actually cause any further
harm after all. Research would need to be done to determine this.
While straightforward Pigovian subsidies would have funding
problems, particularly when introducing them for the first time, there are other approaches. One was examined by Professor
Kim Swales of the University of Strathclyde (See [4] (http://www.faxfn.org/03_jobs.htm)).
This avoids funding problems by not having an actual subsidy but a virtual one — the funds flow is always from employers to
the government, being netted off by the virtual subsidy before funds ever change hands. This may also be analysed by means of
game theory (e.g "the prisoner's dilemma" or "the tragedy of the commons").
Alternatively, in the United States, many economists see the "earned income tax credit" (EITC, a wage subsidy) in the Federal
income tax as providing the poverty-fighting benefits of the minimum wage without the non-budgetary costs, while being superior
to most welfare state anti-poverty programs. One problem has been that many of the working poor (the target of this program) have
a hard time with the tax forms needed to receive the EITC payment. There may also be long delays between when the money is needed
and when the EITC payments are received. That is, a person might become eligible for the EITC in April but then get laid off for
the rest of the year. But this person would not get help from the credit until nearly a year later (since Americans pay their
taxes in April). Further, like with the minimum wage, those people working at home taking care of children and other loved ones
do not receive any benefits; only those doing paid labor are rewarded.
Finally, if these kinds of "complications" do not exist, it is possible that the benefit of the tax credit is received by the
employer: assume that for low-skill workers the equilibrium market wage equals "X." Before the EITC is introduced, all of this
wage is paid by their employers. After the EITC is instituted, the workers receive Y + Z, where Y is the new
wage paid by employers and Z is the tax credit. If the labor market returns to the same equilibrium, then X =
Y + Z. This means that the low-skill workers receive exactly the same amount as before the EITC was introduced and
that the employer is paying less to the employees. This issue needs to examined further.
Worldwide minimum wages
The list below gives the official minimum wage rates. Some countries are more effective than others at enforcing these laws,
so that the effective minimum wage may be lower than the official one. Exchange rates as of March 1, 2005.
| Australia |
AUD 467.40 (US$370) per week; most workers receive higher wages through enterprise
agreements or individual contracts |
| Austria |
none by law; instead, nationwide collective bargaining agreements set minimum wages by job classification for each industry;
the accepted unofficial annual minimum wage is €10,000 to €11,000 (US$13,260 to US$14,580) |
| Brazil |
R$300 (US$115) a month; annually adjusted by the
Government |
| Canada |
set by each province and territory; hourly wages vary from CAN$5.90 (US$4.7) to CAN$8.00 (US$6.4) to CAN$8.50 (US$6.8);
Ontario and Alberta have a minimum wage rate for youths lower than their respective minimums for adult workers; see
List of minimum wages in Canada |
| Chile |
120,000 pesos (US$210) per month for those aged 18–65; 90,327
pesos (US$160) for those younger than 18 and for those older than 65; and 78,050 pesos (US$135) for honorary payments; subject to
adjustment annually |
| China |
none |
| Belgium |
€1,243 (US$1,650) a month for workers over 21 years of age; 18-year-olds must be paid at least 82 percent of the
minimum, 19-year-olds 88 percent, and 20-year-olds 94 percent of the minimum. |
| Bulgaria |
150 leva (US$102) per month |
| Denmark |
none by law, but national labor agreements effectively set a wage floor; the average net wage including pension benefits of
adult workers in 2003 was 177 kroner (US$32) per hour |
| Finland |
5,39 euros per hour or 926,40 euros per month, except where collective bargaining agreements have negotiated higher
sector-specific minimum wages |
| France |
€7.61 (US$10) per hour |
| Germany |
none by law; set by collective bargaining agreements |
| Greece |
€28 (US$37) daily and €616 (US$817) monthly; set by the GSEE and the Employers' Association through collective bargaining and routinely ratified by the Ministry
of Labor |
| Hong Kong |
none |
| Hungary |
53,000 HUF (US$290) per month; set by the IRC through agreement among its
participants, representatives of the Government, employers, and employees |
| Israel |
none |
| Italy |
none by law; instead set by a collective bargaining agreements on a sector-by-sector basis; when an employer and a union fail
to reach an agreement, courts may determine fair wages on the basis of practice in comparable activities, although this rarely
occurs in practice |
| Ireland |
€7 (US$9) per hour |
| Luxembourg |
varies according to the worker's age and number of dependents; for a single worker over the age of 18 is €1,403
(US$1,860) per month for unskilled workers, and €1,684 (US$2,230) per month for skilled workers |
| Netherlands |
€1,249.20 (US$1,660) per month plus 8% holiday allowance, summing to €1,349.14 (US$1,720) (the amount is less for
those 22 years old or younger) |
| New Zealand |
NZ$8.50 (US$6) per hour for workers 18 years old or older, and NZ$6.8 (US$5) per hour for
those aged 16 or 17 |
| Portugal |
€374.70 (US$500) per month; covers full-time workers as well as rural workers and domestic employees ages 18 and
over |
| Poland |
824 PLN (US$280) per month |
| Russia |
720 rubles (US$26) per month; to be raised to 800 rubles from September 1, 2005, and to 1,100 rubles from May
1, 2006 |
| Romania |
2.8 million lei (US$100) per month |
| Spain |
€490.80 (US$650) per month |
| Sweden |
none by law; set by collective bargaining contracts every year |
| Switzerland |
none by law; it is normally 3,000 CHF (US$2,450) set by collective agreements |
| Turkey |
444 million lira (US$350) per month; reviewed every 6 months by the
Minimum Wage Commission, a tripartite government-industry-union body |
| United Kingdom |
£3.00 (US$6) per hour for 16-to-17-year-olds who have finished
compulsory education (except apprentices); £4.10 (US$8) per hour for 18-to-21-year-olds; £4.85 (US$9) per hour for 22-year-olds
and above |
| United States |
the federal minimum wage is $5.15 per hour, although workers under age 20 can be paid $4.25 an hour for their first 90 days.
Some states also have minimum wage laws ranging from $2.00 in Oklahoma (for some
jobs not covered by the federal rate), to $7.35 an hour in Washington. Some
cities and counties have living wage ordinances of up to $15.00 an hour
although the groups of workers it applies to are often limited. (29 USC Sec. 206) (OK Statutes 40-197.5) (Revised Code of
Washington Sec. 49.46.020) [5] (http://www.lni.wa.gov/WorkplaceRights/Wages/Minimum/default.asp) |
Minimum wage in the United States
During his presidency, Bill Clinton gave states the power to set minimum
wages above the federal. 12 states have already done so, and the 2004 November ballot could increase that number. Floridians for
All, a coalition consisting of ACORN, unions, and progressive business leaders, was
successful in proposing a Florida minimum wage of $6.15 an hour, adjusted yearly by inflation. Florida voters passed this state
constitutional amendment in the election of November 2nd, 2004.
See List of U.S. state
minimum wages.
Minimum wage in the United Kingdom
Municipal regulation of wage levels began in some towns in 1524. Later, the Trade Boards Act of 1918 made a large number of
trades subject to minimum wages (which varied from trade to trade). These rules were repealed during the Thatcher era. A national minimum wage was introduced for the first time
by Tony Blair's Labour government.
See National Minimum Wage Act.
Reference
External links
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